The violent uprising in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PoK), referred to by Pakistan as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’, has left Pakistan in a state of shock. The intensity and widespread nature of the rebellion have caught the Pakistani authorities completely by surprise.
Islamabad’s immediate response was to impose an information blackout in PoK by cutting off Internet access and restricting media coverage. This attempt to control the narrative meant that the mainstream media barely covered the protests. TV programs scarcely mentioned it, and newspapers avoided writing about it extensively.
Despite these efforts to suppress information, videos showing clashes between locals and officials, fervent speeches calling for independence, and footage of protesters from different parts of the occupied region gathering in Muzaffarabad—the capital of PoK—were disseminated worldwide via social media.
Pakistan’s so-called ‘independent’ media downplayed this significant event, arguably one of the most pivotal in a long time from the region. Interestingly, even the Western media, known for its critique of India’s constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), seemed to ignore these developments, almost as if nothing noteworthy was happening.
Pakistan is currently grappling with unrest not just in PoK but also in other regions such as Balochistan, the Pashtun area, and Punjab. This indicates a broader struggle for control over its territories and points to internal instability.
The Pashtun region, primarily administered under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, saw protests erupt concurrently with a peaceful election held by India in the Union Territory (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir. This stark contrast highlighted the differing circumstances in the two parts of Kashmir.
Images from India-administered Kashmir and Pakistan-administered Kashmir presented a starkly different picture, emphasizing the divergent situations. Pakistan’s primary concern appeared to be how the unrest in PoK might bolster India’s stance on the Kashmir issue overall.
Iconic images reflecting the anger of PoK locals toward Pakistani control showed military vehicles set ablaze and the Pakistani flag being torn down at Kohala, a major entry point from Pakistan’s Punjab province into PoK.
Protesters have called for the complete cessation of special privileges and benefits enjoyed by the ruling class, government officials, judges, and wealthy elites. They have also demanded a ban on government officials using vehicles larger than 1,300 cc.
In the context of PoK, this recent upheaval was inconceivable just a few years ago. The region was historically seen as the main base for radical elements fighting against Indian rule in Indian-administered Kashmir. Society had been heavily radicalized with numerous jihadist groups operating there, under the watchful eye of Pakistani security forces and intelligence officials.
As recently as 2004 in Muzaffarabad, anyone who even considered speaking with visiting Indian journalists would be closely monitored. While a few people openly supported an independent Kashmir, the majority reflected the stance of the Pakistan government.
Signs of trouble were emerging. Pakistani journalists reported former Prime Minister Chaudhry Anwarul Haq—a symbol of PoK’s internal issues—acknowledging that the younger generation in PoK did not share their parents’ allegiance to Pakistan. Anwarul Haq, much like a similarly named former Pakistani leader, assumed his role with the backing of the Pakistan Army. He was appointed after the previous leader, Tanveer Ilyas, was ousted for court rule violations.
Anwarul Haq, elected as a member of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) party, caused a rift within the party upon becoming a leader. His administration was formed with support from defected PTI members allied with lawmakers from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) in the PoK assembly. Predictably, his backers were awarded key positions such as ministerial roles.
Anwarul Haq’s controversial rise to power exacerbated PoK’s governance issues. The region has experienced rapid leadership changes, undermining political stability.
. Currently, the leader spends more time in Islamabad than Muzaffarabad, earning criticism as an ‘absentee leader.’
This breach of trust is a significant factor in the ongoing unrest. With the military exerting such influence over regional politics, the people’s faith in politicians has eroded. Major political parties appear impotent, lacking the charisma or authority to influence protestors. The protest leaders, who identify as the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), have little control over the large, agitated crowds.
The PoK protests, although framed as a ‘movement for rights’ by JAAC, are fundamentally driven by the struggle for basic necessities like food, water, and jobs. The unrest began in May 2023 over hikes in electricity bills and flour prices, and by August, the situation had deteriorated further. Protesters in Rawalakot—close to the Line of Control (LoC)—burned their electricity bills and refused compliance with government mandates.
Demands also included the removal of electricity infrastructure from farmland, leading to widespread protests that quickly spread beyond PoK into other parts of Pakistan, resulting in large-scale demonstrations. The tense and unstable situation required Islamabad to resort to their typical tactic of ignoring the problem until it couldn’t, making noncommittal promises to calm the situation.
On May 9, 2024, the government arrested nearly 70 people to thwart a planned protest in Muzaffarabad, which only fueled the anger, leading to violent clashes in Dadyal—a town in the Mirpur division of PoK.
The subsequent widespread rebellion across PoK swiftly turned violent, with paramilitary forces being deployed. Clashes resulted in the death of three or four protesters, reminiscent of scenes from Palestine, with bodies paraded through streets and calls for revenge resonating.
Economic difficulties in Pakistan are severely impacting PoK. While traditionally reliant on government subsidies for essentials like wheat and electricity, recent price hikes have been devastating. The actual electricity cost for residents, after fees and surcharges, is around 60 Pakistani Rupees (PkR) per unit, despite local production costs being about 3 PkR per unit.
The PoJK government is also demanding a share of profits from regional electricity generation, a demand unmet by a financially struggling central government. Pakistan’s impending tough economic decisions, enforced by agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), could exacerbate the dissatisfaction.
The continuing protests highlight systemic governance issues and a significant lack of political freedom in PoK. Anger stems from feeling alienated and oppressed, without substantial representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly or Senate.
Concessions to PoK protesters could embolden other regions to demand similar reforms, setting a challenging precedent for Islamabad. The government’s potential reforms, including new income tax calculations and additional taxes, could further exacerbate the people’s struggles.
Fundamentally, the growing chasm between the government and its citizens, particularly concerning essential needs, is leading to violent desperation. The PoK protests underscore a failing governance model, with the populace increasingly willing to challenge the authorities.
Groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Pashtun nationalists have expressed solidarity with PoK protesters, suggesting wider regional implications.
Perhaps most perplexing for Pakistan is the possibility that prolonged unrest could prompt residents of PoK to weigh the benefits of aligning with India, whose robust economy presents a stark contrast to Pakistan’s struggles.
India is observing these developments keenly. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s comments on PoK returning to India reflect strategic interests, particularly after the constitutional changes regarding Jammu and Kashmir in 2019. India may consider leveraging the unrest to reclaim territory it considers its own.
(Note: This analysis is based on multiple reports and sources.)
